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THE PATENT OPTION 
Daniel Gervais, PhD* 
There is a shift in the shape of intellectual property tools used to 
strengthen and lengthen the right of pharmaceutical companies to 
exclude others from making and marketing their products. Patents 
have traditionally been the tool of choice. Over the past two 
decades, however, pharmaceutical companies have increased their 
degree of reliance on a right known as “data exclusivity.” This 
right, which now exists in most major jurisdictions, is the right to 
prevent third parties from relying on the clinical trial data submitted 
by another pharmaceutical company to obtain marketing approval 
for a bioequivalent or biosimilar product. The right is included in 
most international trade agreements. 
The patent and data exclusivity regimes are different. The patent 
regime is one-size-fits-all; it protects new, useful, and nonobvious 
inventions subject to sufficiency of disclosure. In contrast, the data 
exclusivity regime has both a different target (only pharmaceuticals) 
and purpose (efficacy and safety). The two systems are administered 
independently. Yet they apply to the same products and the two 
rights belong to the same entities. 
The Article conditions the proposed extension on fuller 
disclosure of clinical data, which would benefit both the public and 
scientists. Although public disclosure of an invention is a key 
function of patent law, it is often of poor quality due to excessive use 
of “patentese.” In the specific case of pharmaceuticals, it is further 
weakened by the fact that patent applications are normally 
commenced well before human clinical trials have been concluded. 
Under current rules, clinical trial data submitted to governments 
are often not made public. 
Finally, the Article proposes text to be used in future trade 
agreements—with specific modalities for developing and least-
developed countries. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article’s proposal is based on the fact that patents are, and 
have always been, optional. The decision to apply for a patent is 
multifaceted. It includes, among other factors, the need to weigh 
whether trade secret protection would lead to a better result.1 Making 
                                                 
 Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law, Professor of French, Director, 
Vanderbilt Intellectual Property Program, Faculty Co-director, LL.M. Program, 
Vanderbilt Law School. 
 1 See David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly 
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1112 (2012) (“The reason to discuss 
patents in an article about the growth of trade secret litigation is that in situations 
that present a company the option of patent or trade secret protection, the critical 
question is which to pursue. There is no simple answer.”); Andrew Beckerman-
Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A 
Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 380 
(2002) (“When innovative technology or technical know-how is eligible for 
either patent or trade secret protection a choice must be made. Although some 
would argue the superiority of patent law makes it the clear choice this is not 
always true. Numerous legal and business considerations can affect the 
choice.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as 
IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 338 (2008) (discussing which inventions 
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a choice between applying for a patent and relying on trade secret 
law is required because generally patents and trade secrets are 
mutually exclusive.2 
The pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on both forms of 
protection: patents for new molecules (due to the high cost of 
innovation and the low cost of copying most new molecules), and 
trade secrecy protection for manufacturing innovations.3 “Trade 
secrecy offers [pharmaceutical companies] the prospect of 
suppressing unfavorable information, thereby minimizing the risk to 
firms that trials of new uses will diminish sales revenues.”4 There 
are several other variables to add to the decision tree that separates 
trade secret from patents, including the relative fragility of patents 
                                                 
benefit more from trade secrecy protection than patents, and noting that “the 
secrecy requirement serves to channel inventors into the appropriate form of IP 
protection”). 
 2 See Jacob Mackler, Intellectual Property Favoritism: Who Wins in the 
Globalized Economy, the Patent or the Trade Secret?, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. 
& INTELL. PROP. L. 263, 284 (2012) (“The disclosure required to obtain a patent 
removes the protections offered by a trade secret as a matter of law.”). There are 
cases where part of the manufacturing know-how or other information can 
remain a trade secret while disclosing enough enable the invention disclosed in 
the patent application. See Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode 
Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2013) (“[E]nablement[] is ‘part of the 
quid pro quo of the patent bargain’—disclosure in exchange for a limited 
monopoly. Enablement, however, only serves as a floor for disclosure. . . .”). 
This may allow inventors to maintain monopoly rights after the expiration of the 
patent. See W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied 
Competition, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1611, 1612 (2017) (“[F]irms use the 
interlocking effects of patents and difficult-to-reverse-engineer trade secrets to 
maintain monopolies long past patent expiration.”). 
 3 See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 
MGMT. SCI. 173, 174 (1986) (analyzing the need for patents due to the ease of 
copying); see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING 
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 42–43 (2004) (noting 
that pharmaceuticals are often easy to copy and “steal”). But see Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 UC 
IRVINE L. REV. 1115, 1130 (2015) (discussing trade secret protections for more 
complex molecules such as biologics). 
 4 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, 
L. & ETHICS 717, 739 (2005) [hereinafter Eisenberg, New Uses]. 
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after issuance.5 The adoption of federal trade secret legislation in 
2016 may have tipped the scales even more in favor of trade 
secrecy.6 
                                                 
 5 A (valid) patent offers solid protection for up to 20 years after filing. 35 
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). In contrast, once a trade secret is out in the open, 
even by mistake, it is very difficult to keep it protected. § 122(b)(1)(A). Patent 
applications are typically published 18 months after filing of the application, a 
point in time at which normally no final decision whether to grant the patent has 
been made. Id. This has been part and parcel of the patent bargain almost from 
its origin. See, e.g., Elgin Nat’l Watch, Co. v. Bulova Watch Co., 118 N.Y.S.2d 
197, 201 (1953) (“There is, of course, no public interest in affording patent 
protection to any art which is not novel and patentable. Therefore, a patent does 
not prove itself. In the interest of free . . . [use of an invention in the public 
domain], a [user] assuming the risks of an infringement suit is allowed to test a 
patent.”). After issuance, patents are somewhat fragile: they can be and are 
challenged for validity. More than half of all patents challenged in court are 
declared invalid in whole or in part. Id. Additionally, courts regularly change the 
boundaries of the realm of patentable subject matter and such changes apply to 
all existing patents, not just to pending applications. See Almeling, supra note 1, 
at 1114–15 (discussing the invalidation of patent claims on a method for 
determining dosing ranges of drugs); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3329–30 (2010) (narrowing the eligibility of business method patents); Mayo 
Collaborative Serv’s. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012) 
(invalidating patent claims on a method for determining dosing ranges of drugs); 
KSR Intl. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (raising the non-
obviousness standard). One could add to this list Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (limiting the availability of patent protection for 
software). Many of those changes have impacted the pharmaceutical industry, as 
demonstrated by the litigation concerning the patents on the BRCA gene tests. 
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013) (holding that isolated, but otherwise unmodified, genetic material was 
not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101). In Mayo, 566 U.S. 66, the Supreme Court 
held that certain diagnostic methods were similarly unpatentable. Id. at 90. For a 
comment on the impact of the cases on research, refer to Laura W. Smalley, Will 
Nanotechnology Products Be Impacted by the Federal Courts’ “Product of 
Nature” Exception to Subject-Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. 101?, 13 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 397, 437–38 (2014) (“Some in the industry 
believe that Prometheus will have a significant impact on biomedical research 
and personalized medicine as expressed in the Petitioners’ brief in Myriad, 
others believe and note that certain patents, particularly on genes, stifle basic 
research and have negative effects on patient treatment options by placing 
certain genes off limits. The biotechnology industry, however, depends on 
patent rights to a great extent, because they are the most important asset for 
obtaining funding.”). 
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Patents are a one-size-fits-all regime. Moreover, neither patents 
nor trade secrets are specific to the pharmaceutical industry. To 
obtain a patent, the applicant’s invention need only pass the 
thresholds of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility.7 The rights of a 
patent owner and terms of protection provided do not vary based on 
the level of inventiveness.8 The patent system thus pays little, if any, 
attention “to whether the drug is an important clinical breakthrough 
or an incremental drug of little therapeutic importance.”9 This 
unresponsiveness to innovation levels is difficult to avoid in the 
patent realm: Patent Offices cannot assess the future efficacy and 
side effects of new pharmaceutical molecules because patent 
applications are typically submitted well before clinical trials have 
been concluded.10 Though early application for a patent is 
                                                 
 6 Defend Trade Secrets Act, S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2016). This 2016 Act 
creates a federal private civil action for trade secret misappropriation but in 
extraordinary circumstances, “[it] also authorizes ex parte application for court-
ordered seizure of property in order to prevent the propagation or dissemination 
of a trade secret.” Richard F. Dole, Jr., Identifying the Trade Secrets at Issue in 
Litigation Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Federal Defend Trade 
Secrets Act, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 470, 500–01 (2017). 
 7 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018). 
 8 See § 154(a) (“Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a 
grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States or importing the invention into the United States, . . . for a term beginning 
on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on 
which the application for the patent was filed.”); see also § 271(a). In rare cases, 
extensions of the term are possible. They are discussed infra (see infra Part 
II.A). 
 9 Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A Comparative 
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 312 (2015). She also notes that 
this seems verified empirically: “[S]tudies of pharmaceutical innovation in the 
United States, Australia, and Europe all found most new drugs were incremental 
innovations and that only between 10 and 30 percent of drugs were more 
therapeutically valuable than existing drugs.” Id. 
 10 See Jaime F. Cárdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An 
Empirical and Economic Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1336 (2014) (“Since a corresponding patent 
application is filed roughly when pre-clinical trials begin, the time between the 
filing of a patent application and the filing of an IND is a good proxy for the 
pre-clinical trials phase.”); see also id. at 1382 (discussing the application of this 
rule under the European Patent Convention); Shashank Upadhye, To Use or Not 
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unavoidably necessary to preserve the novelty of the invention, it 
means that the effective term of the patent (that is, as a tool to gain 
market exclusivity) is reduced by the time spent on clinical trials, 
estimated to be seven and a half to eight years for trials leading to 
marketing approval.11 
There is a third form of intellectual property (“IP”) that, like 
patents and trade secrets, is commonly used by and is specific to the 
pharmaceutical industry. It is the right to prevent reliance by third 
parties wishing to obtain approval of a product similar to the one 
that is already approved for marketing on clinical trial data 
submitted by the data originator.12 This right provides another, 
                                                 
to Use: Reforming Patent Infringement, the Public Use Bar, and the 
Experimental Use Doctrine as Applied to Clinical Testing of Pharmaceutical 
and Medical Device Inventions, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 4 (2002) 
(“Accordingly, the potential drug or medical device patentee faces a very real 
dilemma: (1) whether to test the product in large-scale trials to generate the 
necessary clinical data required by the FDA, but risk creating a public use bar; 
or (2) file a patent application and incur the associated costs prior to any clinical 
testing, not knowing if the product will ever be marketed or will even work.”); 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); see also John W. Schlicher, Biotechnology and the Patent System; Patent 
Law and Procedures for Biotechnology, Health Care and Other Industries, 4 U. 
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 121, 138–40 (1996) (explaining the Experimental Use 
Defense applicable in the face of patent infringement allegations). 
 11 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155–56 (2018); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. 
Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 473 (2007) (defining the term clinical 
trials); see also Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984, S. 1538, 98th Cong. (1984) (allowing patent extensions in special 
circumstances for up to five years, but not exceeding fourteen years from 
marketing approval). 
 12 This is true in US law, as explained infra Part II.B, but also internationally. 
For example, NAFTA provides that if “as a condition for approving the 
marketing of pharmaceutical . . . products that utilize new chemical entities, the 
submission of undisclosed test or other data necessary to determine whether the 
use of such products is safe and effective . . . no person other than the person that 
submitted them may, without the latter’s permission, rely on such data in 
support of an application for product approval during a reasonable period of 
time after their submission. For this purpose, a reasonable period shall normally 
mean not less than five years. . . .”) (emphasis added). See North American Free 
Trade Agreement, art. 1711(5)–(6), Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 
605 (1994). 
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powerful form of exclusivity—so much so that it has been dubbed 
“the new IP.”13 Though it has been considered a “pseudo-patent,” 
the right is more appropriately referred to as “data exclusivity.”14 
The overlap between patent protection and data exclusivity has 
received some attention in recent scholarship15—though not enough 
in this Article’s view. One scholar suggested that patent exclusivity 
works better than patents for the pharmaceutical industry and should 
                                                 
 13 See Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 53, 54 (2016) (“For almost thirty years, a new form of intellectual 
property has grown up quietly beneath the surface of societal observation. It is a 
set of government-granted rights that have the quintessential characteristic of 
intellectual property and other forms of property—that is, the right to exclude 
others from the territory. Beginning with a small piece of legislation in the early 
1980s, the system now has tentacles stretching out in many directions. It spans 
more than half a dozen smaller arrangements . . . .”). 
 14 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 359–60 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg, 
Innovation Policy]. FDA and other forms of regulatory approvals necessary to 
market a new product have also been referred to as “regulatory exclusivities,” 
“data exclusivities,” and “market exclusivities.” Yaniv Heled, Regulatory 
Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 300 (2015). These forms of 
protection are most effective at bringing new products (also new indications for 
existing products in the case of the FDA) to the market, not manufacturing 
innovation, for which drug companies often rely instead, as noted in the 
Introduction, on trade secret protection. See W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do 
in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 
B.C. L. REV. 491, 532–36 (2014). 
 15 See Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s Right with It, 15 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 342 (1999) (“[W]hen used for 
the limited purposes to which the Act is suited, orphan drug exclusivity can be a 
potent patent substitute.”). A commentator suggested that the “two-tiered” 
regime (patents and data exclusivity) was advantageous as it decreased the 
burden on the patent office, which could apply very low threshold to judge a 
drug’s future utility and let the FDA add “quasi-protection to the truly useful 
products.” William E. Ridgway, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy 
Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1244 (2006). However, why 
one still needs patents in that context is not clear. In addition, that commentator 
noted that “using two tiers complicates innovation policy. Instead of solely fine-
tuning patent law’s balance between protection and competition, drug 
innovation policy must also balance between institutions–complexities that 
caution against the FDA’s seemingly haphazard approach thus far[,]” thus 
requiring “institutional balancing.” Id. at 1250. 
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be the preferred route.16 This Article takes a different, arguably 
opposite approach, suggesting instead to modulate data exclusivity 
based on the existence (or not) of a patent, which depends in turn on 
whether the inventor or pharmaceutical company chooses (hence the 
“option”) to apply for or maintain a patent. Simply put, the idea is 
to modify current rules for data exclusivity by extending such 
protection if two conditions are met: (a) no patent is applied for or 
the patentee lets it lapse; and (b) clinical data are made available to 
the public, within limits discussed in the Article.17 Appropriate 
variations per country and type of product also form part of the 
proposal. The Article uses the optionality of patents as a way 
forward. The proposal has three main objectives: protect innovators 
by providing an incentive to research also non-patentable 
compounds; serve the public’s access to new medicines and to data 
about their efficacy; and allow non-market based uses of new drugs 
during the exclusivity period by other scientists and competitors.18 
This Article’s proposal of a significant transformation of global 
regulatory incentives available for pharmaceutical research is 
presented against a backdrop of pending trade and investment 
agreements that may entrench current regulatory regimes and make 
those regimes harder to change and adapt.19 Yet, there is time.20 
                                                 
 16 See Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological 
Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 419, 420–24 (2012). 
 17 See infra Part III.B. 
 18 See id. 
 19 In particular, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) 
between the United States and the European Union. See Daniel Acquah, 
Extending the Limits of Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents and Data Outside 
the EU—Is There A Need To Rebalance?, 45 IIC INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & 
COPYRIGHT 256, 282 (2014) (“The EU . . . enacted something different with 
regard to its data exclusivity law (the introduction of the 8 + 2 + 1 formula) . . . . 
In a twist, the American pharmaceutical industries have called for 11 years of 
data exclusivity—citing the European example—which could possibly lead to 
some form of harmonisation [sic] of law in this area especially with the start of 
negotiations on a [TTIP].”). With this in mind, the Article contains treaty 
language that could be used as an amendment to existing and future trade 
instruments. See app. A and B. 
 20 As of the summer of 2018, with the United States out of the previously 
completed text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”), the remaining parties 
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This Article’s roadmap is as follows. Part II explicates the ins 
and outs of data exclusivity.21 Part III presents the proposed solution 
and presents its advantages over the current regime. Part IV 
discusses international aspects. It should be read in conjunction with 
the Appendix, which contains text that can be used to amend 
existing and future intellectual property sections of trade 
agreements. 
II.  DATA EXCLUSIVITY 
Data exclusivity has become the new battleground in 
international trade negotiations for pharmaceutical companies intent 
on increasing international sources of revenue.22 A study of data 
exclusivity regimes around the world performed by the 
pharmaceutical industry showed that while the introduction in 
domestic law of such exclusivity did not correlate with an increase 
in investment by pharmaceutical companies, it did drive prices 
higher and was more powerful in that respect than patents.23 The 
                                                 
signed a new agreement called the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-
Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”), which lowered state obligations regarding the 
two types of regulatory incentives examined in this Article: pharmaceutical 
patents and data exclusivity. See GOV’T OF CANADA, WHAT DOES THE CPTPP 
MEAN FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? (Nov. 23, 2018) (“[In regards to] patents 
and pharmaceuticals, the parties agreed to suspend the TPP obligations on 
patent-term adjustment and patent-term restoration, which required parties to 
adjust the patent term in respect of patent office and marketing approval delays. 
The parties also agreed to suspend all provisions dealing with data protection for 
small-molecule drugs and biologics . . . .”); see also Max Rubinson, Exploring 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Complexities through the Lens of Its Intellectual 
Property Rights Chapter, 31 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 449, 461 (2017). 
 21 This Article assumes that the reader is somewhat familiar with the basic 
tenets of patent law and therefore does not provide a full review of patent law. 
 22 The shift was clear in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) provisions on 
data exclusivity, which go far beyond those contained in the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”). See Sean M. 
Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 169–70 
(2012). The TRIPS provisions are discussed infra Part II.A. 
 23 The pharmaceutical industry association published a detailed compilation of 
laws showing the status of data exclusivity in 43 countries and the European 
Union. See Data Exclusivity: Encouraging Development of New Medicines, 
INT’L FED’N OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS & ASS’NS (July, 2011), 
366 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 357 
reason why data exclusivity seems to be underperforming as an 
incentive to new research is in part because its term often overlaps 
with patent protection, and this overlap makes it difficult to parse 
the effects of each right, as the study fails to identify cases where 
data exclusivity was present without a correlating patent.24 However, 
the study shows that data exclusivity can have an effect on prices 
and can thus help generate a financial return on investment in 
clinical trials.25 
Internationally, data exclusivity is fast becoming a new norm: A 
2011 study of 43 countries showed that 29 of them (69%) protected 
against some form of reliance of the approval of a new chemical 
entity by a competitor.26 
                                                 
https://www.ifpma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/IFPMA_2011_Data_Exclusivity__En_Web.pdf 
[hereinafter IFPMA Study]. Legal methods used vary. Some (e.g., Brazil) even 
use criminal law and others (e.g., Bahrain) conflate data exclusivity with trade 
secret violation thus protecting only disclosure in a manner contrary to honest 
commercial practices, not non-reliance. The term of protection varies although a 
majority of the countries surveyed (27 countries or 64%) apply five years. Then 
there are numerous exceptions allowing reliance in specific circumstances that 
vary considerably in both scope and purpose. See id. at 13, 52. For a detailed 
study on the impact of data exclusivity on pharmaceutical prices in Jordan, see 
Rand Alawi & Ibrahim Alabbadi, Investigating the Effect of Data Exclusivity on 
the Pharmaceutical Sector in Jordan, 8 JORDAN J. PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 70 
(2015). 
 24 See IFPMA Study, supra note 23. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See id. According to the US Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), a 
“new chemical entity” (“NCE”) means a drug that contains no “active moiety” 
previously approved by FDA in any other application submitted under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2018). An 
“active moiety” essentially means the molecule responsible for the physiological 
or pharmacological action of the drug substance. A contrario, all others would 
not qualify as “new.” See Council of the European Economic Community, 
Council Directive 65/65/EEC (January 26, 1965), amended by Council Directive 
87/21/EEC (December 22, 1986); see also the judgment of the European Court 
of Justice of December 3, 1998 in The Queen v. The Licensing Authority 
established by the Medicines Act 1968 (acting by The Medicines Control 
Agency), Ex Parte Generics (UK) Ltd, The Wellcome Foundation Ltd and Glaxo 
Operations UK Ltd and Others (1998) (C–368/96), especially [32–37]. This is a 
different threshold than the worldwide novelty test used in patent law which 
looks for identity between a claimed invention (or, more precisely, each claim in 
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To understand the growing importance of data exclusivity, one 
should first be familiar with its ins and outs. 
A. Overview of Data Exclusivity 
Data exclusivity is the right of the originator of pharmaceutical 
test data (clinical trials) to prevent reliance on such data by 
competitors wishing to obtain marketing approval for their own 
bioequivalent product.27 It is not, therefore, market exclusivity for 
the product: absent a parallel patent on the molecule or compound 
being tested, data exclusivity does not prevent subsequent entrants 
from doing exactly what the first entrant did—develop the product, 
test it, submit a full application, and launch the drug. Indeed, data 
exclusivity has also been described negatively as the “absence of an 
abbreviated pathway,” which implies its main feature as forcing a 
second-comer to redo clinical trials and submit for approval using 
the full, normal pathway.28 The option of redoing clinical trials from 
scratch is often illusory as the costs of clinical trials may well 
present an insurmountable barrier.29 Moreover, there are potential 
ethical issues in redoing clinical tests (assuming some patients 
would get a placebo) with a drug that has been shown in previous 
                                                 
the patent application) and a single element of prior art. See Chung-Lun 
Shen, Patent Infringement and Reasonable Allowance of New Technologies in 
Claim Construction, 25 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 333 
n.21 (2015) (“On determination of novelty, the strict identity rule and the 
inherent doctrine are implemented to ensure that the invention is anticipated by 
known prior art. The strict identity rule focuses on the comparison between the 
invention and a single document as prior art.”). 
 27 Bioequivalence is “the absence of a significant difference in the rate and 
extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical 
equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug 
action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an 
appropriately designed study.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2018). 
 28 Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
91, 110 (2016) (emphasis omitted). 
 29 See Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA 
Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1458 (2013) (“To the 
extent that a new filer wishes to conduct his own safety and efficacy studies, the 
exclusivity provisions are not a barrier to market entry. Exclusivity provisions 
are effective because most safety and efficacy studies are costly and the return 
on investment in these studies diminishes with every subsequent market 
entrant.”). 
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clinical trials to be effective enough to be allowed to be 
commercialized.30 
Data exclusivity was first introduced in US law by the 1984 
Hatch-Waxman Act, which provided for five years of data 
exclusivity for applications relating to a new “active ingredient.”31 
Under the system put in place by that legislation, an innovator may 
apply for three additional years of data exclusivity on approvals for 
changes to the drug, such as new uses or dosage forms, but only 
when submission of new clinical data is required.32 The Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 added a six-month 
period of exclusivity as a reward for conducting pediatric trials of 
drugs.33 In the case of a specific category of pharmaceuticals known 
as biologics, data exclusivity is provided for 12 years with a 
potential addition of 12 more years.34 
                                                 
 30 A second set of clinical trials on an already approved drug (by a second 
company) would seem to constitute a form of post-marketing clinical trials (that 
is, post marketing by the originator). See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical 
Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-
Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 68–81 (2008). In the United 
States, such trials are limited by law to very specific cases. Id. at 103–04. There 
might be ways in which these regulations could be changed to allow, e.g., 
comparative testing if two molecules in a double-blind study without 
encountering the same level of ethical concerns. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, David 
Wendler & Christine Grady, What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 
JAMA 2701, 2703 (2000) (describing the seven requirements for determining 
whether clinical research is ethical). 
 31 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). See Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, supra note 
14, at 359–60. 
 32 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)–(iv) (2018). 
 33 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997), extended by Best Pharmaceuticals for Children 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002). 
 34 See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. 
§ 2575(a)(2) (2009) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 262 by adding sub-section (k)(7)); 
see also S. Comm. On Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, S. Res. 36, 111th 
Cong. § 602(a)(2) (2009) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 262 by adding sub-section 
(k)(7)). Biologics are defined and discussed infra Part II.C. In Europe, by 
contrast, the data exclusivity period for biologics is 10 years. See Linfong 
Tzeng, Follow-on Biologics, Data Exclusivity, and the FDA, 25 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 135, 145–46 (2010). 
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While the common form of data exclusivity regimes is 
nonreliance, there is a form of market exclusivity available in this 
realm under in the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, which directs the FDA 
to grant seven years of market exclusivity for products to treat 
orphan diseases (conditions affecting fewer than 200,000 patients in 
the United States or roughly 1 in 1,600)—“even if many products 
qualifying for exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act have had large 
and profitable markets for off-label use.”35 This means that a 
competitor could not access the market even if it is willing to 
perform clinical trials anew.36 
                                                 
 35 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983); see also 
Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, supra note 14, at 359; Lietzan, supra note 28, at 
110 (“An orphan drug is intended to treat a rare disease or condition; the sponsor 
makes this showing by demonstrating that the disease affects fewer than 200,000 
persons in this country or that the company does not expect to recover its costs 
of research and development when marketing the product. If a drug has been 
designated as an orphan drug, then—upon approval—it is entitled to seven years 
of market exclusivity.”). 
 36 The United States is not alone in providing this type of protection. Europe 
and Japan have similar mechanisms for orphan drugs in their legislative arsenal 
but there are notable differences. See Durhane Wong-Rieger & Francis P. 
Rieger, Health Policies for Orphan Diseases: International Comparison of 
Regulatory, Reimbursement and Health Services Policies, in RARE DISEASES IN 
THE AGE OF HEALTH 2.0 267, 269–70 (Rajeev K. Bali et al. eds., 2014). In 
Japan, the target is much narrower than in the US (1 in 30,000 persons as 
compared to 1 in 1,600). Id. In Europe the number is closer to the US: It is set at 
1 in 2,000 but with “the additional criteria that the disease be considered life-
threatening, seriously debilitating or a serious and chronic condition and having 
no satisfactory diagnosis, prevention or treatment.” Id. In both the EU and 
Japan, market exclusivity for orphan drugs is set at 10 years. Id. The EU body of 
law covering clinical trials is contained for the most part in Directive 
2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use, OJ L 136/34 30 April 2004; and Regulation (EC) No 
726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
laying down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of 
medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency, OJ L 136/1, 30 April 2004. Id. For the relevenat Japanese 
law, see Article 14-4 of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law (Law No. 145, 1960). 
Id. 
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B. The Role of the FDA in Data Exclusivity 
1.  The FDA 
According to its website,  
the mission of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER) is to ensure that drugs marketed in this 
country are safe and effective. CDER does not test drugs, 
although the Center’s Office of Testing and Research does 
conduct limited research in the areas of drug quality, safety, and 
effectiveness.37  
How it performs this role can be briefly described as follows: After 
a period of testing new molecules and compounds, decisions are 
made to launch preclinical and then clinical trials. Companies 
submit an Investigational New Drug (“IND”) Application, in order 
to not only transport the drug across state lines but also determine 
whether “the compound exhibits pharmacological activity that 
justifies commercial development.”38 This activity is followed by 
preclinical studies during which the drug is tested in a lab and animal 
species.39 After this, three phases of clinical trials must be conducted 
before the FDA will grant approval.40 The FDA explains the three 
phases as follows: 
Phase 1 involves healthy volunteers and aims to determine the 
drug’s most frequent side effects and its metabolization mechanism. 
The number of subjects typically ranges from 20 to 80.41 Phase 2 can 
only be launched if Phase 1 does not reveal unacceptable toxicity, 
emphasizing effectiveness rather than safety.42 The drug is tested 
between a few dozen and 300 people with a certain disease or 
                                                 
 37 How are Developed and Approved, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fd
a.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApprov
ed/default.htm (last updated Oct. 4, 2018). 
 38 Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelo
pedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplicatio
n/default.htm (last updated Oct. 5, 2017). 
 39 The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/
ucm143534.htm (last updated Nov. 24, 2017). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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condition.43 If Phase 2 shows effectiveness, Phase 3 studies can 
begin, targeting anywhere from several hundred to about 3,000 
people.44 The FDA does not manage the clinical trials, although it 
can inspect clinical trial sites and does so about 300-400 times a 
year.45 Approximately 3% of inspections lead to a finding of 
“numerous or serious deviations, such as falsification of data,” 
which the FDA classifies “official action indicated.”46 
If the clinical trials are successful, the manufacturer can file a 
New Drug Application (“NDA”). The drug then enters Phase 4, or 
postmarketing research, which requires monitoring of the new 
drug’s effects.47 Postmarketing research is divided into 
“postmarketing requirements (PMRs)” (studies and clinical trials 
that sponsors are required to conduct under one or more statutes or 
regulations) and “postmarketing commitments (PMCs)” (studies or 
clinical trials that a sponsor has agreed to conduct, but that are not 
required by a statute or regulation.48 
                                                 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Jessica Chao, Examining the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act: A Legislative Proposal Granting Mandatory Post-Marketing Exceptions, 32 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 655 (2014). 
 48 Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Introduction, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInfo
rmation/Post-marketingPhaseIVCommitments/default.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 
2016). The FDA can require the following studies or clinical trials: 
(1) “Postmarketing studies or clinical trials to demonstrate clinical 
benefit for drugs approved under the accelerated approval 
requirements in 21 CFR 314.510 and 21 CFR 601.41.” Id.  
(2) “Deferred pediatric studies (21 CFR 314.55(b) and 601.27(b)), 
where studies are required under the Pediatric Research Equity Act 
(PREA).” Id. 
(3) “Studies or clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy in 
humans that must be conducted at the time of use of products 
approved under the Animal Efficacy Rule (21 CFR 314.610(b)(1) 
and 601.91(b)(1)).” Id. 
(4) Trials to assess a known serious risk related to the use of the drug 
or signals of serious risk related to the use of the drug or to identify 
an unexpected serious risk when available data indicate the 
potential for a serious risk.  
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The FDA also has regulatory approval powers over drug 
labeling. It can “deny a drug application if it finds that the labeling 
information is not adequate or is false or misleading [and] . . . must 
withdraw approval if it finds a drug is unsafe or the labeling is false 
or misleading.”49 Thus, the role of the FDA is not to ensure that a 
drug is new, but that it is safe and effective.50 This is assessed on the 
basis of evidence that the benefits outweigh the risks.51 The degree 
of novelty of the drug is not assessed specifically, but it is a factor 
taken into account.52 
2.  The Hatch-Waxman Compromise 
The Hatch-Waxman Act, which introduced data exclusivity into 
United States law, was a compromise. On the one hand, it allowed 
the extension of patent terms for new pharmaceuticals for the benefit 
                                                 
Id. The last item on the list was added by the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act of 2007 (“FDAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 
(2007)). See also Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Legislative 
Background, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCom
plianceRegulatoryInformation/Post-
marketingPhaseIVCommitments/ucm064633.htm (last updated June 14, 2018). 
 49 Howard L. Dorfman et al., Presumption of Innocence: FDA’s Authority to 
Regulate the Specifics of Prescription Drug Labeling and the Preemption 
Debate, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 588 (2006). 
 50 Frequently Asked Questions about the FDA Drug Approval Process, FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/SpecialFeatures
/ucm279676.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2017) (“Drugs intended for human use are 
evaluated by FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) to ensure 
that drugs marketed in the United States are safe and effective.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 51 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. & FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S APPLICATION OF STATUTORY FACTORS IN DETERMINING 
WHEN A REMS IS NECESSARY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInforma
tion/Guidances/UCM521504.pdf (“This guidance is intended to clarify how the 
Food and Drug Administration [FDA or Agency] applies the factors set forth in 
section 505-1 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [FD&C Act] [21 
U.S.C. 355-1] in determining whether a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy 
[REMS] is necessary to ensure that the benefits of a drug outweigh its risks.”). 
 52 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(b) (2016), which deals with the content of an IND, 
notes that the “amount of information on a particular drug that must be 
submitted . . . depends upon such factors as the novelty of the drug.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
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of innovators; on the other hand, it allowed competitors (“generics”) 
to file Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDA”) to gain faster 
market access after the expiration of a patent.53 As the House 
Committee on the Judiciary noted, FDA rules prior to Hatch-
Waxman “had serious anti-competitive effects” as the “net result of 
these rules has been the practical extension of the monopoly position 
of the patent holder beyond the expiration of the patent.”54 Under the 
ANDA process introduced by the Act, the applicant “need only 
prove that the generic drug is interchangeable, or bioequivalent, 
with a brand name drug already on the market.”55 Holders of 
approved NDAs— typically the patent holders—are required to 
disclose all patents that “could reasonably be asserted if a person not 
licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of 
the drug[,]” the list of which the FDA publishes in a publication 
called the “Orange Book.”56 
While the introduction of term extension and ANDAs may have 
been a step forward, the system put in place by Hatch-Waxman 
contains labyrinthine details that reflect the difficulty of reaching a 
compromise. Let us take a brief look at some of them to illustrate 
the point. First, the filing of an ANDA (also referred to as 
“Paragraph IV Certification”) is treated as a technical act of patent 
infringement of patents mentioned in the Orange Book.57 This is 
known as “patent linkage,” which can be defined as “a practice by 
some national regulatory authorities of denying approval of generic 
drugs that are ‘linked’ to an existing patent.”58 In other words, 
                                                 
 53 In contrast to a New Drug Application (“NDA”), this applies essentially to 
small molecules, not biologics, which are discussed infra Part C. See Tam Q. 
Dinh, Potential Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of Generic Biologics Under 
Existing Law and Proposed Reforms to the Law, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77, 90 
(2007) (explaining that any abbreviated approval must occur via the PHSA for 
“biological product,” but leaving open the option that certain biologics might be 
labeled as “drugs” subject to an ANDA). 
 54 H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984). 
 55 Id. 
 56 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (c)(1) (2018); see Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, 
supra note 14, at 358. 
 57 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2018). 
 58 CYNTHIA HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENT AND RELATED RIGHTS 273 (2011); 
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despite the dissimilar histories and policy purposes of the patent 
system (for inventions in all fields) and the FDA regulatory approval 
of new medicines, Hatch-Waxman “links” patents to the FDA 
approval.59 A generic drug maker must provide notice to both the 
owner of patents listed in respect of the molecule it is seeking to get 
approved to manufacture, upon receipt of which notice the patent 
owner has the option to sue.60 If the patent owner does not bring suit 
within 45 days of the notice, the FDA may issue final approval of 
the ANDA once its approval requirements have been satisfied.61 If 
the patent holder does sue, the ANDA process is automatically 
suspended for 30 months.62 Perhaps as an acknowledgement of the 
different institutional roles of the FDA and the USPTO, the Federal 
Circuit has held that the Hatch-Waxman Act does not require the 
FDA to review patents for validity and relevance (infringement) 
before listing them in the Orange Book.63 This might explain the 
automatic nature of the suspension but the system has been criticized 
as “rife with abuse by patent holders; it effectively requires generic 
applicants to engage in multiyear litigation with patent holders 
before they may market their medicines.”64 Finally, as part of the 
Hatch-Waxman bargain, the first filer of an ANDA obtains a “180-
day period of generic marketing exclusivity during which time [the] 
                                                 
see also Jennifer D. Cieluch, The FTC Has A Dog in the Patent Monopoly 
Fight: Will Antitrust’s Bite Kill Generic Challenges?, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
1, 29–30 (2015). 
 59 See Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, The Hatch-Waxman Act: 
Prescriptions for Innovative and Inexpensive Medicines, 19 U. BALT. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 107, 145 (2011). 
 60 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2018). 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id.; see also John A. Vernon, Alan Bennett & Joseph H. Golec, 
Exploration of Potential Economics of Follow-on Biologics and Implications for 
Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, 16 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 55, 63 (2010). 
 63 See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 64 Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Rights in Global Trade 
Framework: IP Trends in Developing Countries, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
95, 98 (2004). By comparison, not only do applications for generic drug 
authorization in the European Union not require an affirmation of patent status, 
patent linkage is prohibited. See Peter Picht, New Law on Reverse Payment 
Settlements—The Agenda for Courts and the Legislature After the Supreme 
Court’s Actavis Ruling, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105, 136 (2013). 
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FDA will not approve” a ANDA filed later by another applicant.65 
This was presented as an incentive to file the first ANDA knowing 
that it would likely be accompanied by shouldering the burden of 
patent litigation.66 
C. Biologics as a Special Case 
Biologics are the product of biotechnological manipulations; 
they are large, complex molecules, such as monoclonal antibodies 
and recombinant proteins typically produced with living cultures of 
mammalian, microbial, or yeast cells.67 Biologics are drugs 
generally derived from living materials, including blood-derived 
products, vaccines, and most protein products. The biotechnology 
industry has “brought to market over 254 new medicines, products 
that account for one out of every eight prescriptions written 
                                                 
 65 Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2018); Aaron S. Kesselheim & 
Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need A Re-Designed 
Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 
345 (2015) (“The 180-day generic exclusivity period offered to the first generic 
to challenge a pharmaceutical patent creates a financial incentive to bring 
generic drugs to market as early as possible, and potentially clears away weak 
patents so that other generic firms can enter the market at the end of the 
exclusivity period.”). 
 66 See Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-
Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 174 (2005) (“[T]o provide an incentive to generic 
companies to challenge innovative companies’ patents by making paragraph 
certifications, the Hatch-Waxman Act introduced a 180-day period of marketing 
exclusivity to the first ANDA applicant that files a paragraph IV certification as 
to a patent, under certain circumstances.”). In 2003, Congress amended the 
Hatch-Waxman Act to allow an ANDA filer to bring a declaratory judgment 
action for non-infringement and/or invalidity if the patent owner/NDA holder 
has brought no infringement action within the 45-day notice period. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2201 (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C) (2018). 
 67 Section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (21 U.S.C. § 351 (2018)) 
defines a biological product by a list of product types: a biologic may be “a 
virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or 
derivative, allergenic product, . . . or analogous product, . . . applicable to the 
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.” Public 
Health Service Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2006); see also Vernon 
et al., supra note 62, at 65. 
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worldwide.”68 The complexity of biologics makes it impossible to 
make an exact copy.69 Unlike small-molecule chemical compounds 
(where generic replicates can be made), the best one can hope for is 
“biosimilar.”70 This explains why the bioequivalence analysis 
applicable to small molecule pharmaceutical is not directly portable 
to the biologics context. 71 
To address issues arising out of the different nature of biologics, 
Congress enacted the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act (BPCIA) in 2010 as part of the Affordable Care Act, which “was 
intended to help innovators and pharmaceutical drug developers by 
streamlining the regulation of biologics, much as the Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984 did with respect to small molecule generic 
drugs.”72 The BPCIA has also been described as “an attempt by 
Congress to bring down the cost of biologics.”73 “The BPCIA also 
seeks to incentivize innovation by providing the reference product 
sponsor (RPS) a period of market exclusivity[,]” abbreviated 
regulatory approval pathway for follow-on biologics (“FOBs”).74 
                                                 
 68 Sarah Sorscher, A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?: Considering the 
Implications of Data Exclusivity as a Tool for Innovation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 285, 285–86 (2009); see also F. Randy Vogenberg et al., Beyond the 
Cost of Biologics: Employer Survey Reveals Gap in Understanding Role of 
Specialty Pharmacy and Benefit Design, 5 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 23, 
23–24 (2012) (explaining that even with a small number of prescriptions, 
biologics account for much of the cost increases in prescription plans). 
 69 See Eric Lawrence Levi, Using Data Exclusivity Grants to Incentivize 
Cumulative Innovation of Biologics’ Manufacturing Processes, 66 AM. U.L. 
REV. 911, 969 (2017). 
 70 See id. 
 71 See Robert N. Sahr, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: 
Innovation Must Come Before Price Competition, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. 
F., July 2009, at 12. 
 72 Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262); Hunter 
Malasky, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Commercial 
Marketing in the Spotlight, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., February 2017, at 1. 
 73 Max Rubinson, Exploring the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Complexities 
Through the Lens of Its Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, 31 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 449, 464 (2017). 
 74 Id. 
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In spite of this specific legislative grant of authority, the FDA 
has proven resistant to promoting biosimilars approval.75 
Additionally, policies such as a naming systems for biosimilars or 
state regulations can “burden the substitution of interchangeable 
biologics required under the BPCIA [while] offer [ing] no gains in 
patient safety or efficacy and muddl[ing] a uniform national 
program.”76 These obstacles may “impose costly barriers to entry to 
potential biosimilar manufacturers, thereby lengthening original 
biologics manufacturers’ effective monopoly periods, inhibiting 
innovation in potential biosimilars, increasing drug costs, and 
reducing access to the most effective available medications.”77 
The BPCIA contains a complex structured patent dispute 
resolution process known as the “patent dance.”78 Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act the patent holder submits to the FDA patents for listing 
in the Orange Book.79 The BPCIA, in contrast, requires instead that 
the patent owner and the applicant “dance,” to “engage in serial 
                                                 
 75 See Joanna M. Shepherd, Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and Barriers to 
Entry, 25 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. MED. 139, 148 (2015). 
 76 Id. at 161. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See Dov Hirsch, The Riddle of the Mysterious Patent Dance Wrapped in an 
Enigma: Is the Patent Dance of the BPCIA Optional or Mandatory?, 27 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 645, 649 (2017); see also Lindsay 
Kelly, Biologics in the Practice of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 26 
(2016). 
 79 See Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, supra note 14, at 358. This is sometimes 
referred to as “linkage.” The issue of patent “delinkage” is different; it concerns 
delinking the price of pharmaceuticals and the costs of research and 
development (R&D). On the use of linkage in the first sense, see e.g., 
Manoranjan Ayilyath, FTAs Knitting a Web of Higher Intellectual Property 
Standards Globally?, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 97, 97–98 (2015) (“Data 
exclusivity and patent linkage provisions, strikingly similar to the US domestic 
laws, also found their way into the statutes of other countries through the doors 
opened to them by these bilateral trade agreements.”). On use of delinkage with 
the second meaning, see U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, REPORT ON THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 5 (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00c1
a3ef761/t/57d9c6ebf5e231b2f02cd3d4/1473890031320/UNSG+HLP+Report+F
INAL+12+Sept+2016.pdf (defining delinkage as a “term used to describe a key 
characteristics of any financing model of innovation characterized by the 
uncoupling of R&D costs and consumer prices for health technologies”). 
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communications to identify the patents that should be subject to 
litigation.”80 The patent litigation framework contained in the 
BPCIA comprises nearly a third of the total provisions of the Act 
itself.81 
In his study of biologics marketing regulations, Professor Yaniv 
Heled, whose work focuses on legal and ethical aspects of 
biomedical technologies, suggests that, despite the flaws of the 
BPCIA regime, “a statutory exclusivities regime is preferable to a 
patent regime,” in part because it avoids “evergreening.”82 Such a 
non-structural change of the biologic is unlikely to result in the 
award of a new data exclusivity period.83 Conversely, “affording 
patent protection for biological products in parallel to FDA-
instituted exclusivities increases the risk of abuse by developers of 
biological products in a variety of ways and disserves the public 
interest that both regimes were created to promote.”84 
The next frontier is synthetic biology, a very recent 
development.85 Synthetic biology is “characterized by an increased 
reliance on chemically synthesized DNA, rather than the cloned 
                                                 
 80 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(I)(8)(A) (2016) (“[An] applicant shall provide notice to 
the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of the first 
commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection 
(k).”); see also Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1678 (2017) 
(holding that the notice may be given prior to FDA approval of the biosimilar). 
For an explanation of the background of the patent dance in the BPCIA, see 
Brian F. McMahon, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 
2009: Legislative Imprudence, Patent Devaluation, and the False Start of a 
Multi-Billion Dollar Industry, 100 KY. L.J. 635, 664 (2012). 
 81 See McMahon, supra note 80, at 663–64. 
 82 Heled, supra note 16, at 464–66; see also Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. 
Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1101, 1106 (2008) (“‘[E]vergreening’ refers to attempts by owners of 
pharmaceutical product patents to effectively extend the term of those patents by 
obtaining related patents on modified forms of the same drug, new delivery 
systems for the drug, new uses of the drug, and the like.”). 
 83 See Heled, supra note 16, at 463–64. 
 84 Id. at 462. 
 85 See Christopher M. Holman, Developments in Synthetic Biology are 
Altering the IP Imperatives of Biotechnology, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 
462 (2015) (“In 2010, a team of scientists led by Craig Venter captured the 
world’s attention by reporting the successful synthesis of a functional bacterial 
genome composed entirely of synthetic DNA.”). 
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copies of naturally occurring DNA.”86 Whether the pharmaceutical 
that a company seeks to market is a traditional small molecule, a 
biologic, or a product of synthetic biology, all normally require 
marketing approval and a scientific assessment of efficacy which 
can be modulated by the regulator without changing the 
fundamental nature of data exclusivity. 
D. Comparison of Patents and Data Exclusivity 
Patent offices in any country generally review patent 
applications to determine whether such applications disclose 
patentable subject matter and whether that subject matter is new, 
useful and non-obvious, and, under US law at least, adequately 
described and enabled in the application.87 Unlike the FDA process, 
patent applications on new drugs are typically filed well before any 
clinical trials have begun—when data on safety and effectiveness is 
available. Indeed, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) makes it clear that no “actual evidence of success in 
treating humans” is required.88 
Non-reliance by a third party on the approval, after clinical 
trials, of a particular molecule, protein, or other product is not the 
                                                 
 86 Id. at 419–20. The proposal contained in Part III is technologically neutral 
because of its emphasis on disclosure and an assessment of efficacy, which 
would apply equally, as a legal doctrinal matter, to any type of pharmaceutical. 
 87 See William G. Giltinan, The Disclosure Function, Academic/Private 
Partnerships, and the Case for Affirmatively Used, Multinational Grace 
Periods, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 109, 135 (2014) (comparing differences in 
the disclosure requirements in different jurisdictions). In countries other than 
Canada and the United States, novelty is also required, but instead of utility and 
non-obviousness a patent must involve an inventive step and be industrially 
applicable. See Linda L. Lee, Trials and Trips-Ulations: Indian Patent Law and 
Novartis Ag v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 309 (2008) 
(“Inventive step and industrial applicability correlate to the concepts of non-
obviousness and utility in the United States.”). 
 88 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (USPTO), Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure ¶ 2107.03 (9th ed. 2014) (“The applicant does not have to prove that 
a correlation exists between a particular activity and an asserted therapeutic use 
of a compound as a matter of statistical certainty, nor does he or she have to 
provide actual evidence of success in treating humans where such a utility is 
asserted. Instead, as the courts have repeatedly held, all that is required is a 
reasonable correlation between the activity and the asserted use.”). 
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same as a patent right to prevent anyone from making or using an 
invention. The fact that patents and data exclusivity can operate like 
telescoping powers to exclude has been acknowledged by 
regulators. The FDA website refers to, for example, “patents or 
other periods of exclusivity on brand-name drugs,” both of which 
must expire before generic versions are available.89 In a summary of 
the various data exclusivity periods available, the FDA also notes 
that “[e]xclusivity is exclusive marketing rights granted by the FDA 
upon approval of a drug and can run concurrently with a patent or 
not.”90 The two rights overlap and produce similar exclusory effects 
reflecting different normative objectives. 
Patents and data exclusivity can be compared systematically: 
• A patent is a right to prevent others from making, using, and 
selling.91 Data exclusivity by contrast prevents reliance on 
the existence of satisfactory test data, thus forcing a 
competitor to perform its own tests and obtain separate 
approval, or wait for the non-reliance period to end.92 
• Patents operate in a one-size-fits-all regime.93 Data 
exclusivity is not. US law already reflects such differences 
up to a point. It contains distinct regimes for orphan drugs, 
biologics, and new chemical entities.94 
                                                 
 89 Drugs are Developed and Approved, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelo
pedandApproved/default.htm (last updated October 4, 2018). 
 90 FDA/CDER SBIA Chronicles, Patents and Exclusivity, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (May 19, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapp
rovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm447307.pdf. 
 91 See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 92 See Shepherd, supra note 75, at 161. 
 93 Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, supra note 14, at 364 (“The patent system is a 
one-size-fits-all legal regime that applies essentially the same rules to inventions 
arising in biopharmaceutical research, automotive engineering, information 
technology, semiconductors, rocket science, and even business methods. But the 
needs of these fields for patent protection differ greatly, making it difficult to 
fine-tune the patent laws to meet the needs of the pharmaceutical industry 
without upsetting the balance of protection and competition in other 
industries.”). 
 94 See Feldman, supra note 13, at 70–82. 
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• Patents have been described as a contract between an 
inventor and society, and the exchange of considerations is 
a limited monopoly on one side and public disclosure on the 
other.95 Data exclusivity requires little and sometimes no 
disclosure of test data. The proposal contained in this Article 
is meant to rebalance data exclusivity by requiring 
disclosure. 
• A patent is (much) cheaper to obtain than clinical trial data. 
Proceeding through all three phases of pre-marketing 
clinical trials in the United States costs hundreds of millions 
of dollars.96 In the case of biologics, development and trial 
costs combined can reportedly reach over 2 billion dollars, 
while a patent application costs a very small fraction of that 
amount.97 The costs of clinical trials in other jurisdictions can 
                                                 
 95 See Pfaff v. Wells Elec’s., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent 
system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation 
and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for 
an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”). 
 96 See Kimberly Rhodes & Michael Romeo, Syncing the Unsyncable: Legal 
and Policy Implications of Paperless Clinical Trials, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. 
L.J. 185, 188 (2017) (“According to the FDA, 70% of drugs pass phase one, 
33% pass phase two and 25% to 30% pass phase three. To put those numbers 
into more understandable terms, according to the FDA, roughly six out of every 
one hundred drugs that begin the clinical trial process make it past phase three. 
Moreover, some sources suggest that the time from lab to market for a new drug 
is about 15 years, and costs can be upwards of $30 to $40 million just for the 
first three phases of a clinical trial, and then another $30 to $40 million if the 
drug makes it to phase four. Some studies even suggest that when accounting for 
all the ‘behind the scenes’ costs, the average cost of getting a drug from lab to 
market could be as high as $1.3 billion.”). 
 97 See Joseph DiMasi & Henry Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical 
R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 473–76 
(2007) (mentioning $1.24 billion in 2005 dollars as an estimate of the overall 
economic cost of bringing a new biologic to market); see also Lietzan, supra 
note 28, at 107 (mentioning $2.6 billion in 2013 dollars for the 1995 to 2007 
period). By contrast, the figure of $500,000 is often mentioned as an average to 
patent an invention in most significant jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kelce Wilson & 
Claudia Tapia Garcia, How Much Should You Invest in Patents?, 45 LES 
NOUVELLES 47, 54 (2010). The cost comparison ratio is about 5,000/1 by 
dividing the amount to patent an invention by the total from the 1995 to 2007 
period. 
382 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 357 
be significantly lower, however.98 In China for example, 
clinical trials tend to be about one third of the average cost 
of those in the United States.99 
• The terms of protection are different. A patent has a fixed 
term ending 20 years from the date of filing. In the case of 
new pharmaceuticals, much of this time is spent on proving 
that the drug works and obtaining approval from the Food & 
Drug Administration (FDA), which led Congress to allow 
patent terms to be extended using a complex formula based 
in part on the time required to secure approval.100 Data 
exclusivity tends to last five years in most territories that 
have a fixed term. Longer terms are available in a few 
jurisdictions, often for specific products such as biologics, or 
to encourage additional research, as with pediatric 
indications.101 
• A patent can be invalidated after issuance for lack of novelty 
or utility (industrial applicability), lack of obviousness 
(inventive step), or because the subject matter is patent-
                                                 
 98 This is according to a figure mentioned in Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The 
Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 151, 166 (2003). This figure is highly debatable. A 2015 study showed 
that costs vary by type of field of medicine but range in the $30–40 million per 
phase. See Aylin Sertkaya et al., Examination of Clinical Trial Costs and 
Barriers for Drug Development, E. RES. GRP. (July 25, 2015), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/examination-clinical-trial-costs-and-barriers-drug-
development; see also Rhodes & Romeo, supra note 96, at 188 (stating that 
reports of large cost centers not associated directly with clinical trials, also 
known as “behind the scenes” costs, can bring the total cost to a multiple of the 
actual clinical costs). 
 99 See Benjamin P. Liu, Fighting Poison with Poison? The Chinese 
Experience with Pharmaceutical Patent Linkage, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 623, 649–50 (2012). 
 100 A patent has an initial term of protection of 20 years from the filing date. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). However, in the United States, maintenance 
fees must be paid at 3 to 3.5 years, 7 to 7.5 years, and 11 to 11.5 years after the 
date of issue (with 6 months “grace periods” after each one). See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 41(b) (2018). For a discussion regarding the exclusivity of data, see Hatch-
Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). 
 101 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
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ineligible.102 A recent study found that biotechnological 
patents suffered from a higher invalidation rate 
(approximately 42 percent) than the average invalidation 
rate (approximately 29 percent).103 
• A valid patent provides a strong right, namely the exclusive 
right to make, use or sell, subject only to exceptions such as 
experimental use.104 By contrast, a competitor of a firm that 
has obtained FDA approval can, even during the data 
exclusivity period, conduct clinical trials and obtain 
approval separately if it is not relying on the data.105 This key 
limit to the right provided by a data exclusivity period is that 
it allows competitors to seek their own approval to sell the 
same product by performing their own tests, although in 
many cases this limit is mostly theoretical.106 This is not 
applicable in the case of orphan drugs for which exclusivity 
is ratcheted up from non-reliance to full market exclusivity.107 
• The data to be presented to obtain a patent and FDA approval 
are vastly different in scope and purpose. To obtain a patent, 
which is typically applied for early in the drug development 
process to maintain novelty, there is no need to demonstrate 
the drug’s safety and efficacy on humans.108 The patent 
                                                 
 102 See generally LAWRENCE M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW 
HANDBOOK § 3 (2008). 
 103 See Shine Tu, Invalidated Patents and Associated Patent Examiners, 18 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 135, 153 (2015). 
 104 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this 
title, whoever without authority makes, uses, . . . or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States . . . during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the 
patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018). 
 105 See Trevor M. Cook, Regulatory Data Protection in Pharmaceuticals and 
Other Sectors, in IP HANDBOOK FOR BEST PRACTICES (Anatole Krattiger et al. 
eds., 2007), http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch04/p10/. 
 106 See Johnson, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 107 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing orphan works); see 
also TREVOR M. COOK, THE PROTECTION OF REGULATORY DATA IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL AND OTHER SECTORS 440 (2000). 
 108 See Amanda Fachler, The Need for Reform in Pharmaceutical Protection: 
The Inapplicability of the Patent System to the Pharmaceutical Industry and the 
Recommendation of a Shift Towards Regulatory Exclusivities, 24 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1059, 1070, 1079 (2014). 
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application, which will typically be published eighteen 
months after filing, should enable a “person having ordinary 
skill in the art” (PHOSITA) to make and use the molecule, 
with very little else on the molecule’s efficacy in actual 
patients.109 At the FDA, in contrast, the applicant is required 
to provide “chemical-ingredient lists accompanied by a 
statement of the drug’s composition; a detailed report 
containing how and where the drug was manufactured, 
processed and packaged;” as well as “samples of the drug or 
its components at the request of the Secretary; samples of the 
proposed drug label; and any supplemental documentation 
as deemed necessary by the Secretary or with respect to the 
drug’s pending approval.”110 
• Finally, in some countries, a patent allows the patent holder 
to prevent importation of a product legally put on the market 
with the patent holder’s consent in another country, a right 
to prevent what is known as “parallel importation.”111 This 
matter is not regulated by the TRIPS Agreement, however, 
which allows WTO members to set their own rules in respect 
of parallel imports.112 The United States generally applies 
                                                 
 109 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2018) (discussing the publication of 
pending applications). For a discussion regarding the type of data required to 
support a patent application for a new pharmaceutical, see Antoinette F. 
Konski, The Utility Rejection in Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Prosecution 
Practice, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 821, 824–25 (1994) (“Proof of 
utility also can be established by clinical, in vivo or in vitro data, or 
combinations of these, as long as the evidence would be convincing to one 
skilled in the art. The level of proof for meeting this requirement varies with the 
claimed subject matter. For example, for chemical compounds or compositions 
having structures similar to those of well-known chemical entities that have an 
accepted utility, no proof of utility should be required beyond the assertion of 
utility in the application.”). 
 110 Fachler, supra note 108, at 1070. 
 111 See Daniel Gervais & Susy Frankel, International Intellectual Property 
Rules and Parallel Importing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXHAUSTION AND 
PARALLEL IMPORTS 85 (I. Calboli & E. Lee eds., 2016). 
 112 TRIPS Agreement, infra note 158, at art. 6. Some countries apply so-called 
national or regional exhaustion, thus requiring that the product be first put on the 
market in that country or region (e.g., the European Union) to be sold legally. 
See Enrico Bonadio, Parallel Imports In A Global Market: Should a 
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international exhaustion in this field, allowing importation 
of a patented product marketed in a foreign territory into the 
US market.113 In the case of data exclusivity, the question is 
whether a government can rely on foreign approval of a new 
pharmaceutical to allow marketing of the product in its 
territory. 
III.  A NEW ROLE FOR DATA EXCLUSIVITY 
The system of legal incentives for pharmaceutical research is not 
working well for either innovators or for other constituencies in this 
debate, including the public. It seems that “there is compelling 
evidence that the current periods of FDA-administered exclusivity 
are inadequate because pharmaceutical companies continue to 
screen drugs with weak patent protection out of their pipelines.”114 
This Article’s proposal to ameliorate the current regime is to 
increase data exclusivity in exchange for not applying for a patent, 
letting it lapse, or licensing it to anyone on a royalty-free basis. 
Details are contained in the next section, and all advantages of the 
proposed solution are explained in Section B of this Part. 
In many cases one of the main advantages will be precisely that 
the patentable nature of the invention will not matter. Many 
                                                 
Generalised International Exhaustion be the Next Step?, 33 EUR. INT. PROP. 
REV. 153, 154 (2011) (“A Community-wide exhaustion has been affirmed by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) since the 1960s and then codified in several 
IPR-related directives and regulations.”). 
 113 See Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1528 
(2017), rev’d 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This is true as a matter of patent 
law but other forms of regulation may prevent importation such as safety 
concerns. See William E. Ridgway, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy 
Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1250 n.119 (2006) (“TRIPs 
does not prevent because of its exception for exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights. The pharmaceutical industry prevents parallel imports through 
the FDA instead, by prohibiting importation of products made for foreign 
markets governed by different labeling requirements.”); see also Todd A. 
Rosenfield, The Counterfeit Drug Invasion: How Drug Reimportation 
Unjustifiably Poses a Threat to the Health of the U.S. Public, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 1047, 1065–66 (2004). 
 114 Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 566–67 (2009). 
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naturally occurring or other sub-patentable compounds likely 
deserve an investment in clinical research but the non-patentable 
nature of the compound and the perceived inadequacy of relying 
only on a relatively short period of data exclusivity to recoup the 
investment and turn a profit may undermine the opportunity for 
laboratories to perform this research.115 
A. Overview of Proposed Solution 
The proposed solution is this: offer innovators an extension of 
the data exclusivity period available for a new product by up to four 
years in all markets in which they do not apply for a patent.116 If a 
patent had been applied for and granted, the applicant would be 
required to let it lapse.117 If a patent was applied for and the 
application rejected, an extension would be available, as this might 
still incentivize research in areas where a patent would be 
unavailable. 
Applying for the extension would also require disclosure of 
abridged clinical data results, subject to limits discussed below. This 
is normatively aligned with recent developments favoring increased 
data sharing about clinical trials, including the Principles for 
Responsible Data Sharing (Principles) in and between the United 
States and the European Union.118 “The Principles encourage 
member companies to share scientific information, including 
patient-level data and study protocols, from clinical trials on patients 
                                                 
 115 See id. (discussing the value of subpatentable invention); see also Jerome 
Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in 
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1781–82 (2000) (proposing 
a liability regime rather than an exclusive right to protect subpatentable 
inventions). 
 116 The expression up to four years is used here because, as explained in Part 
V and the Appendix, the period could be shorter for developing countries. 
 117 See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1521, 1525–26 (2005) (explaining the renewal fees payable in the United States 
at three intervals during the life of a patent [three and a half years after issuance, 
seven and a half years after issuance, and eleven and a half years after issuance] 
and showing that “53.71% of all patentees do allow their patents to expire for 
failure to pay one of their maintenance fees.”). 
 118 PHRMA & EFPIA, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE CLINICAL TRIAL DATA 
SHARING: OUR COMMITMENT TO PATIENTS AND RESEARCHERS 1–2 (2013). 
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in the United States and European Union with qualified researchers 
through individual agreements.”119 Recall that patents require an 
enabling disclosure, but in the case of pharmaceuticals where 
disclosure happens early (typically well before human clinical trials) 
and is mired in “patentese,” the technical jargon too often used to 
abscond true disclosure obligations.120 Data exclusivity can be even 
worse in that respect as it may require only outcomes, without any 
disclosure of test data, if they are positive enough to apply for 
regulatory approval.121 The additional transparency required to 
benefit from the Article’s proposed solution fixes this issue and 
echoes calls for greater transparency in clinical data, as exemplified 
at the 2017 World Health Assembly of the World Health 
Organization (“WHO”) and in recent scholarship.122 The Article’s 
proposal would ameliorate both the access and the transparency 
                                                 
 119 Amy Westergren, The Data Liberation Movement: Regulation of Clinical 
Trial Data Sharing in The European Union and The United States, 38 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 887, 910 (2016). 
 120 See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 621, 633–34 (2010) (“A crucial step in this process is transforming the 
inventor’s plain English into patentese, the specialized language that patents are 
written in. This transformation, whether deliberately or not, leads many 
applicants to fall short of fulfilling the statutory mandate to provide a written 
description using ‘full, clear, concise, and exact terms.’”). 
 121 See Shreya Matilal, Do Developing Countries Need A Pharmaceutical 
Data-Exclusivity Regime?, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 268, 272 (2010) 
(comparing disclosure obligations under the EU and US data exclusivity 
regimes). 
 122 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., CANCER PREVENTION AND CONTROL IN THE 
CONTEXT OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH, doc. A70/A/CONF./9, at 6 (May 25, 
2017) (calling for the preparation of “a comprehensive technical report to the 
Executive Board at its 144th session that examines pricing approaches, 
including transparency, and their impact on availability and affordability of 
medicines . . . ”). The resolution was adopted on May 30, 2017. See World’s 
Health Ministers Renew Commitment to Cancer Prevention and Control, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 30, 2017), http://www.who.int/cancer/media/news/
cancer-prevention-resolution/en/. For a discussion regarding the advantages of 
greater transparency on clinical data, see, e.g., Jorge Contreras, Leviathan in the 
Commons: Biomedical Data and the State, in GOVERNING MEDICAL 
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 19, 35–42 (K.J. Strandburg, B.M. Frischmann & M.J. 
Madison eds., 2017). 
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issues raised at the Assembly while maintaining and possibly 
improving incentives available to develop new pharmaceuticals. 
The notion of abridged clinical data is used here to reflect the 
fact that the full release of all clinical data may in some cases have 
anticompetitive effects. To avoid letting this be used as a valid 
argument against the proposal, it is suggested that where necessary 
the regulator could provide limits on the required disclosure, upon 
application by the innovator. In such a case, the determination of the 
exact dataset that should be released and in which form should be 
guided by a dual goal, namely to inform the public and the necessity 
to protect legitimate competitive concerns of the applicant.123 That 
said, the public’s right to know should allow access to all outcomes. 
To quote Professor Rebecca Eisenberg, an expert in patent law and 
the regulation of biopharmaceutical innovation, “[p]ublic 
availability of data from clinical trials would also be valuable for 
patients, doctors, and insurers, permitting them to make better 
choices of drugs.”124 
                                                 
 123 A similar idea is contained in a paper by Nicholson Price. See W. 
Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics 
Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1053 (2016) (“Public 
disclosure of precise and enabling manufacturing methods could be made a 
condition of FDA approval [in a mandate-based version] or could be 
incentivized with an additional period of FDA-enforced regulatory exclusivity 
[in an incentive-based version].”). 
 124 Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 4, at 738. An intriguing possible addition 
to this part of the proposal would be to confer longer exclusivity in exchange for 
the deposit of the original cell lines used to produce new biologics. Unlike small 
molecule pharmaceuticals, biologics cannot be copied without access to the 
innovator’s cell line, hence the term “biosimilar.” Access to the cell line is 
critical in developing a biologics biosimilar. See Lisa Diependaele, Julian 
Cockbain & Sigrid Sterckx, Similar or the Same? Why Biosimilars Are Not the 
Solution, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 776, 777 (“As the original biologic’s cell line 
and manufacturing process will be closely guarded as trade secrets, a generic 
competitor will have no other option than to develop a new cell line.”); see also 
Isabel Andujar Perez et al., Ensuring the Consistency of Biosimilars, 23 
CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL DESIGN 1–6 (2017). Cell lines are not typically 
disclosed in patent applications and in fact are often protected as trade secrets, 
this making the production of a biosimilar much more expensive than the copy 
of a small molecule. See Price II & Rai, supra note 123, at 1051–53 (suggesting 
that there should be disclosure of the Chemistry and Manufacturing Controls of 
Biologics Licensing Application [BLA] upon FDA approval). 
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Administratively, the extension would be granted as soon as the 
conditions just noted are complied with; that is, no substantive 
examination would be required. Because the system is an extension, 
it presupposes that a period of data exclusivity has already been 
granted. The exclusivity during the extension period would be of the 
same nature as the exclusivity it extends. Thus, in most cases it 
would be non-reliance, but in the rare cases where full market 
exclusivity has been granted, this would be the case also under the 
extension. The public benefits of allowing non-market-based uses 
and disclosure of test date would still obtain.125 
One risk that innovators might see is that, for the small 
proportion of patents on major innovations, there is a risk: the 
product would not remain secret, especially during clinical trials, 
and someone other than the innovator might get to the FDA first.126 
This is why the Article’s proposal allows an innovator to apply for 
a patent, but the innovator could not apply for the extension without 
letting the patent lapse. On average, there are 12.3 years between 
when a patent application is filed and when FDA approval is granted 
for the corresponding product.127 In the biologics sphere, even with 
patent term extension, primary patents are expected to expire, on 
average, around five to eleven years after the expiration of the 
market exclusivity period of twelve to twelve and a half years under 
BPCIA.128 Recall that fees must be paid to maintain a patent in force 
eleven to eleven and a half years after the date of issue (with six-
month “grace periods” after each one). The average pendency of 
applications is two years (at the USPTO), which means that a patent 
is up for maintenance fee payment approximately thirteen years 
after the date of application on average, based on the above numbers 
seven months after the FDA has approved the product for marketing. 
This option to apply for a patent, but then letting it lapse, would 
                                                 
 125 See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 4, at 738. 
 126 See Ho, supra note 9. 
 127 Cárdenas-Navia, supra note 10, at 1320. 
 128 Heled, supra note 16, at 447. 
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allow innovators time to fully test the new product before making a 
decision on the patent option.129 
The proposal is informed by some of the same insights used by 
Greg Dolin to support his proposed solution, though limited to 
genetic materials and suggesting marketing (not data) exclusivity 
and aimed to free researchers to do research using genetic materials 
without infringing patents while providing exclusivity to 
innovators.130 Before looking into the details of the implementation 
of the proposed solution, the Article explicates the advantages of the 
proposed solution over the current regime. 
B. Advantages of the Proposed Solution 
The Article’s proposal is based on a voluntary, incentive-based 
approach to limit the overlap between patent and data exclusivity by 
focusing primarily on the latter. It would ameliorate current 
outcomes for several reasons: 
• First, patents on pharmaceuticals are applied for too early, 
before any actual utility in treating disease in humans has 
been shown. Data exclusivity is subject to a showing in 
actual clinical trials that a new drug works.131 This means that 
in one case (patents) a right is granted on a molecule or 
compound that may not have any real utility, yet might not 
be invalidated for this deficiency.132 In another case (data 
                                                 
 129 The average pendency in 2017 at the USPTO was 24.2 months. See 
USPTO, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FY 17 2 (2018), https://w
ww.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY17PAR.pdf. 
 130 See Dolin, supra note 29, at 1458–59 (“[T]he exclusive rights would be 
broader than the current data-based provisions in the BPCIA, they would be, in 
several respects, more limited than patent-based rights to exclude. First, and 
most obvious, the exclusivity obtained through the FDA licensing scheme, 
unlike that obtained via a patent, would not apply to every ‘use’ of the 
product.”). 
 131 See USPTO, supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 132 This is in part due to the standard for utility being very low in the United 
States, especially in the pharmaceutical area. See Sarah Renée Craig, Placebo 
Patents: Creating Stronger Intellectual Property Protection for 
Pharmaceuticals Approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration, 19 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 151 (2011) (“In the pharmaceutical context, the threshold 
for meeting the utility requirement is relatively low.”). 
MAR. 2019] The Patent Option 391 
exclusivity), the “consideration” is real: the drug has 
demonstrated its efficacy, subject to any additional post-
marketing trials;133 
• Second, patents require novelty, which may discourage 
innovators from investigating possible medical uses of 
known compounds—for example, those based in traditional 
medicinal knowledge—existing in naturally occurring 
substances (such as plants), which would amount to non-
patentable subject matter in most cases.134 Providing better 
protection for products brought to the market from this 
source would open up an entirely new area to commercial 
pharmaceutical research; 
• Third, the FDA and similar agencies in other nations review 
clinical test data at a later stage than when patent protection 
is applied for.135 Simply put, they have better data; 
• Fourth, because data exclusivity prevents reliance and 
marketing in some cases, not mere “use,” competitors would 
be allowed to test and use the drug without having to rely on 
Bolar or similar exemptions.136 The possibility that would be 
                                                 
 133 See Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Introduction, supra 
note 48 (discussing the notion of post-marketing trials). 
 134 Often, looking at traditional medicine can serve as a basis to suggest 
clinical trials, but traditional medicinal compounds are difficult to patent due to 
lack of novelty. See Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in 
Developing Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 17 (2001) (“[T]he 
novelty requirement will generally impede the patentability of such products. 
Second, policy choices made to increase access to medicines, including a 
limitative approach towards the patentability of natural occurring products and 
uses of existing products, as well as strict patentability requirements, may lead 
to the exclusion of protection for most traditional medicinal products.”); see also 
Xuan Li & Weiwei Li, Inadequacy of Patent Regime on Traditional Medicinal 
Knowledge–A Diagnosis of 13-Year Traditional Medicinal Knowledge Patent 
Experience in China, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 125 (2007) (discussing the 
protection by patent of traditional Chinese medicines); Chidi Oguamanam, 
Patents and Traditional Medicine: Digital Capture, Creative Legal 
Interventions, and the Dialectics of Knowledge Transformation, 15 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489 (2008). 
 135 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 136 The name “Bolar” for exemptions allowing a generic manufacturer to use a 
patented pharmaceutical to submit a marketing approval comes from Roche 
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available to any third party to make and use new drugs is not 
limited to regulatory approval. Patents allow a patent owner 
to prevent the use of the invention by others. This means 
that, absent an exemption in the statute or at common law, a 
scientist cannot legally use the invention for her own 
research. Though the risk of being sued is small, it is not non-
existent according to a case by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit where experimental use exception was 
shrunk;137 
• Fifth, and relatedly, as a normative matter, scientific 
research, whether it be purely noncommercial, commercial 
(by a competitor), or indeed anywhere on the commercial-
noncommercial continuum, should be allowed. Data 
exclusivity does not stand in the way of researchers. In other 
words, the underlying assumption of the proposal reveals the 
purpose of exclusivity is to affect market incentives, not to 
stifle research. Data exclusivity is best seen as instrumental 
and not derived from some privilege vaguely anchored in 
natural law. By allowing all non-market uses of the product 
to be subject to data exclusivity, the proposal eliminates the 
legal-cultural clash that may prevent scientists from working 
on patented material; and, depending on shrinking 
                                                 
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
a case in which the Federal Circuit determined that Bolar’s use of a patented 
drug for testing purposes constituted patent infringement. Congress responded 
by adopting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018), which states in part that “[i]t shall not 
be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United 
States or import into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a 
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .” Id.; see 
also Jian Xiao, Carving Out A Biotechnology Research Tool Exception to the 
Safe Harbor Provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 23, 
29–32 (2003) (discussing the case and the adoption of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)). 
 137 Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This 
case has been described as reflecting the increasingly commercial nature of 
university-based research. See Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke University: 
Shattering the Myth of Universities’ Experimental Use Defense, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 175, 175 (2004) (“Pure academic research devoid of commercial 
implications is becoming a rarity in an era of federal incentives to turn the fruits 
of government-funded basic research into commercial applications.”). 
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experimental use exception, by refocusing on selling of 
approved drugs instead of laboratory experiments;138 
• Sixth, up to four years of additional protection is a major 
addition to the current regime.139 By creating a “data 
exclusivity extension opportunity, manufacturers will feel 
more comfortable reinvesting their ROI in manufacturing 
efficiency, and manufacturers can capitalize on the complex-
molecule nature of their biologic by exploring 
manufacturing drift.”140 
• Seventh, and relatedly, reducing reliance on patents reduces 
in the same proportion the impact of changes to the realm of 
patentable subject matter in recent Supreme Court opinions, 
which apply to all existing patents in addition to all pending 
applications.141 Those changes impact the pharmaceutical 
industry, as the litigation concerning the BRCA gene tests 
demonstrates.142 
• Eighth, data exclusivity is a safer form of protection unlike 
patents, as it is not subject to invalidations by courts, thus 
reducing litigation costs for both originators and generic 
companies.143 Firms would gain a significant advantage: 
predictability and significantly longer term of exclusivity. 
The Damocles sword of invalidation that weighs heavily 
over an innovator’s head would be removed;144 
• Ninth, because the second condition of the proposed solution 
is to condition the extension of data exclusivity on the 
                                                 
 138 See Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law and 
Science Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a 
Global Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (2012) (referring to the 
“anticommons effects attributed to excesses of the patent system in recent 
years”); see also David Silverstein, Patents, Science and Innovation: Historical 
Linkages and Implications for Global Technological Competitiveness, 17 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 261, 294 (1991). 
 139 See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 140 Levi, supra note 69, at 970. 
 141 See cases cited supra note 5. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See Tu, supra note 103. 
 144 See supra notes 102–03, 143, and accompanying text. 
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release of clinical data, the proposed solution improves the 
quality of the disclosure exponentially (both for the public 
and other scientists) compared to patent law.145 The 
transparency that public availability of clinical data would 
generate should lead to greater scientific accountability, less 
duplication of basic research, and a significant improvement 
in the quality of clinical trials themselves.146 In contrast, 
patents disclose inventions but applicants often obfuscate 
that disclosure by using “patentese.”147 Moreover, patent 
applicants need not disclose much about the actual efficacy 
of the claimed invention in large part because the application 
predates human clinical trials, typically by several years.148 
• Tenth, FDA marketing approval, unlike the processing of 
patent applications, is based on a scientific assessment, the 
modalities of which can be modulated as science and 
technology develop. Scientific advances do not change the 
fundamental nature of the proposed solution, because they 
are incorporated by the very fact that the assessment will 
                                                 
 145 The nature of the information disclosed in the two systems (patent/data 
exclusivity) is thus key. See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 4, at 739 (“By 
requiring that firms conduct rigorous clinical trials before bringing their 
products to market and before making promotional claims for their products, the 
FDA plays an important structural role in promoting a valuable form of 
biomedical R&D that private firms are undermotivated to perform on their own, 
while internalizing the costs of this R&D to the firms. By providing a system of 
independent expert scrutiny of the resulting data and certifying the safety and 
efficacy of tested products for particular indications, the FDA preserves public 
confidence in the integrity of the results while preserving them as proprietary 
information of the sponsor.”). 
 146 Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 
845, 862–63 (2017). 
 147 See Seymore, supra note 120, at 638–39 (“While applicants view patentese 
as an invaluable tool for protecting claim scope, it has drawbacks. First, 
patentese obscures the invention. An interested reader must parse through the 
broad terminology and jargon to figure out both what the inventor actually did 
and intended to encompass by the claims. . . . Second, patentees use patentese to 
sidestep enablement.”). 
 148 See Fachler, supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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follow such changes. Hence, the proposed solution can be 
seen as “technologically forward.”149 
• Eleventh, because patents would still remain available, 
seeing whether pharmaceutical innovators pick them over 
(longer) data exclusivity would provide a useful dataset to 
gauge the perceived value of the two rights; 
• Twelfth, the proposal reduces the complex administrative 
mechanism known as patent linkage, as fewer patents would 
be in application or in force, as not having a patent (or letting 
it lapse) would be a condition of applying for the 
extension.150 
• Finally, any additional period of exclusivity would not be 
based on a patent-specific evergreening game, but on tested 
improvements accompanied by disclosure of additional 
clinical data.151 
C. Term of Protection 
The twenty-year patent term is a mirage in the pharmaceutical 
context: The twelve point three years average FDA approval period 
leaves less than eight years of patent protection, with the added 
                                                 
 149 The proposal is not entirely technology-neutral in that, like EU and US law 
and the TPP, among others, it distinguishes biologics from small molecule 
pharmaceuticals. Put differently, the proposed solution takes account of the 
special nature of biologics (by proposing a different term). In doing so, it 
follows the structure of the current regulatory regime, which treats biologics in a 
distinct fashion. See supra Part II.E. 
 150 For those applicants who opt not to apply for a patent, see text 
accompanying supra note 14. 
 151 On the notion of “evergreening,” see Mueller & Chisum, supra note 82 
(indicating that there is a three-year period of exclusivity for new formulations 
which bars the FDA from approving, when any application to market a generic 
equivalent that relies on the information supporting the approval of the drug or 
the change to the drug for which the information was submitted and the 
exclusivity granted.); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2018); 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.108 (2018); Levi, supra note 69, at 970; Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997), 
extended by Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 
Stat. 1408 (2002). 
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uncertainty of invalidation.152 The current system of data exclusivity 
provides five years of exclusivity with possible extensions.153 
In the case of biologics, patents are expected to expire 
approximately five to eleven years after the expiration of the market 
exclusivity period.154 Indeed, there is a sense among commentators 
who have studied recent research in the field of biologics that an 
extension is warranted—if done correctly.155 Vernon et al. suggested 
sixteen years “to provide the necessary incentives for continued 
biotech R&D investments. The high-risk and uncertain nature of 
biotech R&D has been underscored by the effects of the economic 
downturn on the biotech sector. A majority of biotech companies 
. . . remained unprofitable.”156 Adding four years—thus bringing the 
total to sixteen under US law—appears to be a decent compromise 
close to this suggestion, creating sufficient incentives to avoid 
overlapping protections by patent and to disclose abridged clinical 
data. It is also in line with Levi’s suggested one to four years after 
his own analysis.157 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 
The Article’s proposal is compatible with the TRIPS 
Agreement.158 The Agreement, which binds all members of the 
World Trade Organization, contains minimum patentability 
standards, and specific rules concerning the enforcement of patent 
                                                 
 152 See Mansfield, supra note 3, at 103. 
 153 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Lietzan, supra note 28, at 103 (suggesting that “adoption of a base 
exclusivity term for all drugs close to, or perhaps exceeding, the 12 years 
currently in place for biological drugs--with a modest base extension for 
incremental improvements, exclusivity on a product basis, and limitation of 
abbreviated applications to actual replicas (no hybrids).”). 
 156 Vernon et al., supra note 62, at 74. 
 157 See Levi, supra note 69, at 912. 
 158 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [herinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. The Article does not suggest changes to the patent system. 
Pharmaceutical inventors would voluntarily decide not to apply for a patent. See 
id. 
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and other intellectual property rights.159 A key rule contained in 
TRIPS provides that patents should remain available for inventions 
in all fields of technology.160 Hence the proposed solution—to 
remain well within the boundaries of major international IP 
instruments—does not limit the availability patents. TRIPS also 
limits the ability of WTO Members to require disclosure test data to 
the public, by subjecting the disclosure either to a necessity or 
imposing protection against unfair commercial use. Disclosure that 
the data originator would voluntarily agree to would not be subject 
to such limits. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from which the United 
States withdrew a few days after President Trump took office, 
provided a general minimum term of five years of data exclusivity.161 
For biologics, the TPP provided that countries “can either provide: 
(1) eight years of market exclusivity counting from the date the 
biologic is approved in the country concerned; or (2) five years of 
market exclusivity counting from the date the biologic is approved 
in the country concerned . . . and other measures to deliver a 
comparable market outcome.”162 In the TPP, this is as far as the 
intellectual property and data exclusivity norms go.163 The TPP, 
without the US, renamed The Comprehensive and Progressive 
                                                 
 159 DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 3, 420–27 (4th ed. 2013). 
 160 See id. at 421 (stating that TRIPS does not define the term “invention” thus 
providing some leeway to WTO Members). 
 161 See Rubinson, supra note 20, at 461. 
 162 Id. at 465. 
 163 There is a possible interface with the investment protection chapter, 
however. See Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: 
Investor-State Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines—Eli Lilly v. Canada 
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 32–33 
(2015) (“[A] Party might decide that it has a public-health flexibility-and a 
human rights need-to enact an exception to TPP-based data exclusivity rights in 
the event of the issuance of a TRIPS-or TPP-compliant compulsory license. The 
adversely affected “investor” might conclude that the express language of the 
TPPA IP chapter does not directly authorize such an exception and that the 
failure to pay total compensation as opposed to a mere royalty is an indirect 
expropriation.”). See generally Daniel Gervais, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: Human Rights and Regulatory Lessons from Lilly v. Canada, 8 UC 
IRVINE L. REV. 459 (forthcoming), for a discussion on the Lilly case. 
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Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), suspended all such provisions, 
underscoring the disagreement among nations on granting 
extensions of data exclusivity and setting rules for the future in the 
stone of enforceable trade agreements.164 This provides a window of 
opportunity to rethink data exclusivity and its interface with patents, 
as this Article proposes. 
The text of recent trade deals illustrates the urgency of clarity on 
this point. For example, the EU-Japan trade deal signed in July 2018 
provides for a “compensatory term of protection” (a maximum 
compensatory term of five years after the time of signing) during 
which “a patented invention cannot be worked due to marketing 
approval process.”165 The effective extension of the patent term is 
also proposed as part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP).166 
Appendix B contains language that could be used in a future 
trade agreement or to amend an existing one. Appendix A proposes 
language for a possible amendment to the TRIPS Agreement to 
clarify its existing article on data exclusivity.167 Amending TRIPS is 
not inconceivable; the only amendment to that Agreement since its 
entry into force on January 1, 1995 was made in the pharmaceutical 
area.168 
                                                 
 164 See GOV’T OF CANADA, supra note 20. 
 165 Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the 
Economic Partnership Agreement Between the European Union and Japan, 
COM (2018). The text of the deal was not finalized as of this writing, August 
2018. See EU and Japan sign Economic Partnership Agreement, EUR. 
COMM. (July 17, 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=189
1. 
 166 This is according to a version of the draft text leaked in 2015. See 
Knowledge Ecology International, 2015 Oct 15 version: RCEP IP Chapter, art. 
5.13, https://www.keionline.org/23060.; see also Acquah, supra note 19 
(discussing the draft Transpacific Partnership Agreement). The RCEP involves 
Australia, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. Id. 
 167 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 158, at art. 39.3. 
 168 Id. at art. 31bis (entering into force on Jan. 23, 2017). See TRIPS 
Agreement, World Trade Organization, Jan. 23, 2017. 
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The proposed solution is to extend data exclusivity periods by 
four years for countries other than developing and least-developed 
ones.169 The proposed solution exempts least-developed countries 
from any obligation. The WTO has recognized indirectly that 
intellectual property rights applied to pharmaceutical products do 
not tend to generate positive welfare outcomes in least-developed 
countries defined by the United Nations.170 This recognition comes 
via the suspension of relevant TRIPS obligations for those countries 
and allowing them to import pharmaceuticals produced under a 
compulsory license in derogation to TRIPS Article 31(f), which 
limits compulsory licenses “predominantly” to the supply of the 
domestic market.171 
For developing countries (those above the least-developed 
country threshold but not fully economically developed), the 
proposal is to keep the five year minimum (eight for biologics) and 
three years for pharmaceuticals that meet the conditions of the 
extension. At the same time, modulating the data exclusivity regime 
by allowing those countries to grant to a competitor marketing 
                                                 
 169 The proposal leaves it up to each jurisdiction to decide on ad hoc 
extensions like those that exist in the United States for changes to the drug, such 
as (in the United States) new uses or dosage forms that require submission of 
new clinical data or pediatric trials. See European Modernization Act, supra 
note 33. 
 170 U.N. COMM. FOR DEVELOPMENT POL’Y, UNITED NATIONS, List of Least 
Developed Countries, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-
content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) 
(providing a list of least-developed countries, which is updated every three 
years). 
 171 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 158, art. 31bis. On the suspension of TRIPS 
obligations for least-developed countries, see World Trade Organization General 
Council, Least Developed Country Members—Obligations Under Article 70.8 
And Article 70.9 Of The Trips Agreement With Respect To Pharmaceutical 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/L/971 (Nov. 30, 2015) (“The obligations of least 
developed country Members under paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 70 of the 
TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to pharmaceutical products until 
1 January 2033, or until such a date on which they cease to be a least developed 
country Member, whichever date is earlier.”). 
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approval on payment of a reasonable royalty after a cool down 
period of three years from the initial marketing approval.172 
The proposal thus allows the calibration of incentives based on 
the maturity of each nation or market.173 This is underpinned by the 
premise that, although developing countries need not get free access 
to all new pharmaceuticals, it is legitimate as a matter of public 
health to let less economically developed nations calibrate their 
level of protection.174 
For the sake of completeness, there are two other aspects of this 
debate that are not discussed in the Article’s proposal in large part 
because they are unregulated and a matter of continuing 
disagreement: (a) price-controls, which are not mentioned in the 
TRIPS Agreement; and (b) the specific cases of short-term market 
exclusivity, which the proposal, as it stands, neither mandates nor 
prohibits.175 Both topics would warrant further discussion. The 
related question of pharmacovigilance (monitoring post marketing 
approval) is also left aside.176 
V.  CONCLUSION 
After reviewing the dual protection of pharmaceuticals by patent 
and data exclusivity laws and their overlaps, and the special case of 
                                                 
 172 Under this proposal, during the cool down period no competitor could 
apply for the right to rely on an existing marketing approval. See Moore, supra 
note 117. As explained above, in all cases, an extension of the data exclusivity 
period (which could be less than four years for those countries) would be 
conditioned on the absence of a patent application and agreement to publicly 
disclose clinical data. Id. 
 173 See DANIEL GERVAIS, IP Calibration, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT 86, 103–05 (2d ed. 2014). 
 174 See id. 
 175 On price controls for pharmaceuticals, see U.S. DEP’T. OF COM., INT’L 
TRADE ADMIN., PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD COUNTRIES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, PRICING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 
AND INNOVATION 3 (2004), http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/health/DrugPricingStudy.
pdf (“All OECD governments studied in this report rely on some form of price 
controls to manage spending on pharmaceuticals.”). 
 176 See Felix Shin, Leaping from the “Patent Cliff” into the “Global Drug 
Gap”: Overcoming Exclusivity to Provide Affordable Biosimilars, 37 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 449 (2016). 
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biologics, the Article proposes to offer innovators in the 
pharmaceutical field an extension of their data exclusivity period in 
exchange for refraining from applications, maintaining current 
patent protection, or releasing clinical trial results. The Article can 
be read as an invitation to reflect on the current regulatory incentives 
for privately funded pharmaceutical research. 
APPENDICES 
A. Possible Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement 
Article 39bis 
Data Exclusivity 
1. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the 
marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products 
which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed 
test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable 
effort, shall protect prevent any person other than the person that 
submitted them may, without the latter’s permission, from relying 
on such data in support of an application for product approval for a 
period of not less than five years or eight years (the “non-reliance 
period”) in the case of biologics.177 
2. Members shall extend the period of time mentioned in the 
previous paragraph by four years if (a) no patent has been applied 
for in respect of the pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical 
product submitted for marketing approval and (b) the person that 
submitted the product for approval gives permission to disclose to 
the public an abridged version of such data. 
3. In deciding what constitutes an abridged version of the data, 
Members hall take account both of the need to inform the public of 
the benefits and risks of the product submitted for approval and of 
the need to protect confidential competitive information, if any, 
contained in the data submitted by the person who submitted them. 
                                                 
 177 For the purposes of this Article, a “biologic” may be defined as a virus, 
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or 
derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product applicable to the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings. 
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4.A developing country Member is entitled to limit the non-
reliance period mentioned in paragraph 1 to three years, after which 
time it can allow a person other than the person who submitted the 
data to rely on such data in support of an application for product 
approval subject to the payment of a reasonable royalty to the person 
who submitted the data for the remainder the non-reliance period 
including any extension thereof in accordance with paragraph 2. 
5. A least developed country Member shall have no obligation 
under this Article until 1 January 2033. The Council for TRIPS 
shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-developed country 
Member, accord extensions of this period. 
B. Possible Article for a Free Trade Agreement 
Article __178 
Data Exclusivity 
1. Parties, when requiring, as a condition of approving the 
marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products 
which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed 
test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable 
effort, shall protect prevent any person other than the person that 
submitted them may, without the latter’s permission, from relying 
on such data in support of an application for product approval for a 
period of not less than five years or eight years (the “non-reliance 
period”) -in the case of biologics.* 
2. Parties shall extend the period of time mentioned in the 
previous paragraph by four years if (a) no patent has been applied 
for in respect of the pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical 
product submitted for marketing approval and (b) the person that 
submitted the product for approval gives permission to disclose to 
the public at least an abridged version of such data. 
3. In deciding what constitutes an abridged version of the data, 
Parties shall take account both of the need to inform the public of 
the benefits and risks of the product submitted for approval and of 
the need to protect confidential competitive information, if any, 
contained in the data submitted by the person who submitted them. 
                                                 
 178 In the case of the TRIPS Agreement, this would likely be Article 39bis. 
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4. A developing country Party is entitled to limit the non-
reliance period mentioned in paragraph 1 to three years, after which 
time it can allow a person other than the person who submitted the 
data to rely on such data in support of an application for product 
approval subject to the payment of a reasonable royalty to the person 
who submitted the data for the remainder the non-reliance period 
including any extension thereof in accordance with paragraph 2. 
______________ 
* For the purposes of this Article, a “biologic” may be defined as a virus, 
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or 
derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product applicable to the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings. 
 
